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Nothing could be more hackneyed than the medical malpractice
debate. Trial lawyers, insurers, doctors, and politicians have been
repeating the same arguments for thirty-five years' with no evidence
that they are listening to each other and little concern for the facts.
No one is satisfied with the present system, but improving it seems
to have fallen victim to a failure of imagination.
Perhaps this is because we have not been as careful as we might
be to articulate what the goals of a sensible medical malpractice
system ought to be and because we have paid too little attention to
how best to proceed to achieve the system's goals. Interest group
politics in legislatures and mud slinging litigation may not be the
best ways to sort out the needs of everyone involved in the health
care system. What would a medical malpractice system designed to
maximize institutional competences look like?
The quest for such a system has implications far beyond medical
malpractice reform. I have previously attempted to demonstrate
that focus on process will lead to better results in areas that others
call "bioethics" than will focus on substance.2 If that is also true
with medical malpractice, one may begin to wonder whether it is
true of health law in general, and, if so, whether health law could
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1. For a convenient summary of the activities of the last thirty-five years,
see William M. Sage, The Forgotten Third: Liability Insurance and the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2004, at 10, 12-17.
2. See generally ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN
BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING 169-71 (1996).
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take the lead in directing legal questions away from irresolvable
conflicts about substantive preferences to more productive
approaches. Maybe the law really does have a life of its own, and
maybe the nation would be better off if we let it live it.
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ISSUE
Sound lawmaking requires matching the characteristics of a
social issue with the characteristics of legal institutions to see which
institution or combination of institutions is most likely to deal with
the issues most satisfactorily.3  Once the characteristics are
understood, goals that a neutral observer would approve can be
articulated, and institutional responses can be made.4
What are the characteristics of medical malpractice as a social
issue? Medical malpractice involves injuries whose genesis, nature,
and extent can be evaluated only by experts.! The experts are
members of the same professional groups as the persons who are
alleged to have caused the injuries. The injuries are alleged to have
occurred during the course of a relationship in which a person with
expertise acts on a person who is unlikely to have expertise to
relieve the nonexpert person's fear or suffering, or both, usually in
exchange for a fee. The fear and suffering relate to the person's
health, an interest of the highest value. The actor is a member of a
loosely regulated group that the state has granted a monopoly on
providing services. The idea of efficient breach-purposely
providing lower quality care than promised because that is
economically efficient-is almost inconceivable in this setting,
3. "Most satisfactorily" does not mean "best." Legal institutions are
created and operated by human beings. Thus, they are imperfect. The most
satisfactory legal response to a social issue will be the response that makes the
fewest, cheapest, and most easily correctable mistakes, not the approach that
gets it right. Searching for perfection is doomed to create expensive failures.
As I have argued before, in law half a loaf is not only better than none, but also
better than a whole one. Roger B. Dworkin, Anything New Under the Sun?
Trying to Design a New Legal Institution to Deal with Biomedical Advance, 155
WELTINNENRECHT 165 (2005). See generally DWORKIN, supra note 2, passim.
4. The most satisfactory response is that which would satisfy a neutral
observer or that would be acceptable to all interested parties. To define most
satisfactory any other way would be to say that the best legal response is the
one that happens to serve one's substantive preference. That is what health
law has done for too long as it has purported to serve the substantive goal of
patient autonomy. That approach has been neither successful nor honest. See,
e.g., Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking
Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 235
(2003).
5. See infra Part II.A.
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although using cost-benefit analysis to decide what has been
promised is commonplace. The services that allegedly cause the
injuries are provided to persons of widely disparate wealth in a
society where most persons are at least partly dependent on public
or private insurance to pay for their health care but 15.7% of the
population is uninsured.7 Medical care in the United States costs
more than anywhere else in the world,8 yet Americans fare poorly
compared to people in many other countries in terms of infant
mortality, length of life, and other measures of the quality of health
care.9  Medical malpractice gives rise to intense political
disagreements, but not to deep moral divides like abortion or
assisted suicide. Clearly, malpractice has nothing to do with the
nature and structure of the government.
A. Expertise
Medical malpractice involves injuries whose genesis, nature,
and extent can be evaluated only by experts. The experts are
members of the same professional groups as those who are alleged to
have caused the injuries.
All personal injury cases involve injuries whose nature and
extent can be evaluated only by experts. Medical malpractice differs
in that the genesis of the injuries also requires expertise to evaluate
and in that the experts are members of the same profession as those
charged with causing the harm. Expertise is seldom required to
pinpoint the cause of tort injuries. For example, in auto wreck
cases, a previously healthy person is rear-ended, smashes into the
steering wheel, and has a broken sternum. The crash caused the
injury. Even the classic conundrum cases that fill Torts casebooks °
are problematic for reasons unrelated to the need for expertise.
In medical malpractice, on the other hand, the plaintiff (patient)
was sick or injured or in need of diagnosis before he or she visited
the defendant (doctor, hospital, etc.). The question is whether
something the defendant did or failed to do made the plaintiffs
6. See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYsIS 13-15 (1971) (explaining how
cost-benefit analysis has been used in assessing disease control).
7. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 23 (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
8. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
10. E.g., Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (applying joint and
several liability to two hunters using the same size shot and the same gauge
shotguns who negligently shot in the direction of a companion who was injured
by one or both of the shooters); Kingston v. Chi. & Nw. Ry., 211 N.W. 913, 915
(Wis. 1927) (joining liability for damage caused by two fires).
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condition worse or prevented it from getting better. Only someone
with expertise can form a meaningful opinion about that. Moreover,
only an expert can evaluate professional performance, so that if
fault or even the ability to avoid the harm is to be required for
compensation, expertise will be required again."
The problem is obvious: only medically trained persons have
expertise about medicine. Inexpert legal decision makers are
dependent upon the very persons whose liability they are
considering for the facts on which to base their decision. The fox is
guarding the chicken coop.
Interestingly, in the present litigation setting, doctors, whom
one would expect to approve of the focus on expertise, are often
dissatisfied. A frequently made claim is that charlatans will testify
to almost anything for a fee. 2 The same incompetence that disables
courts from seeing through "expert" opinion that is biased in favor of
doctors also prevents them from evaluating "expert" testimony that
is biased against doctors. Thus, the need for expertise coupled with
the courts' lack of that expertise, and their dependence on doctors
for it, is one crucial characteristic of the malpractice problem that
must be considered in attempting to craft a solution.
B. The Doctor-Patient Relationship
Patients, as well as lawmakers, usually lack medical expertise.
In the doctor-patient relationship, these inexpert patients are acted
upon by physicians who have, or at least claim to have, relevant
expertise. The action involves the patient's health, an interest of the
highest importance. The patient is often suffering, frightened, or
both, and he or she is abjectly dependent upon the doctor for relief.
Thus, the relationship is dramatically unequal with an inexpert,
frightened, or suffering person depending upon an expert to restore
the patient's health. This suggests that any legal regime will have
to take the inequality into account and protect the patient from
unfulfilled expectations of expertise and commitment.
C. The Medical Profession
Physicians are members of a restricted-entry guild with
11. Medical malpractice cases are not unique in this regard. Similarities
may exist in toxic tort cases, adverse reaction cases, and others. The effort here
is to describe the characteristics of malpractice cases. To the extent that other
cases share some or all of those characteristics, they may benefit from legal
responses similar to those adopted for malpractice.
12. For an example of a doctor making this argument in an unsuccessful
attempt to dissuade a court from adopting a national standard of care, see Hall
v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 875 (Miss. 1985).
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monopoly power. 13  The state limits the practice of medicine to
persons it licenses. Doctors control the educational and training
systems that qualify one for a license. Hospitals and managed care
organizations further limit the availability of physicians to treat
specific patients and specific conditions. Thus, patients' choices of
healers are highly restricted. This lack of choice also is relevant to
determining an appropriate system to deal with injuries that result
from medical practice.
D. Efficient Breach and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Patients (at least competent, conscious patients) agree to be
treated by health care providers and to pay for the services they
receive. The providers agree to provide the services in exchange for
the fee. Thus, the provider-patient relationship looks contractual.
Yet the relationship is very different from ordinary contractual
arrangements.
In addition to the disparities in expertise and bargaining power
between health care providers and patients, another major
difference exists. Efficient breach is nearly inconceivable.
Suppose ABC Corporation ("ABC") manufactures widgets. It
agrees to pay ten million dollars to Machine Corporation ("Machine
Corp.") to purchase one of Machine Corp.'s new widget testing
machines. Before delivery and payment, ABC breaches the contract
because Innovative Corporation ("Innovative Corp.") has developed a
new eight million dollar widget tester, which makes fewer mistakes,
both false positive and false negative, than Machine Corp.'s tester
does. If paying Machine Corp.'s damages plus the cost of an
Innovative tester results in ABC being able to produce more and
better widgets at a lower price than complying with its original
contract, then breaching the contract was the right thing to do. It
was an efficient breach. If Machine Corp. receives damages, it is no
worse off, and everyone else is better off than if ABC honored its
contract. Rather than being a "dirty contract breaker," ABC has
behaved like a responsible corporate citizen.
Such a situation in the medical context is almost impossible to
imagine. A doctor or other health care provider can promise to
achieve a specific result, to perform at a higher than normal level,
or, most typically, to provide reasonably competent care. It can
13. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Rationing Health Care: The Unnecessary
Solution, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1533-34 (1992). See generally Sue A. Blevins,
The Medical Monopoly: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?, CATO
POLICY ANALYSIS No. 246 (1995), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-
246.html (discussing the effect of licensure laws and federal regulations in
creating a medical monopoly).
2006]
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never be desirable to provide less than reasonable care because one
of two possibilities must exist. One is that reasonable care means
efficient care so that efficiency and reasonableness are synonymous;
if efficiency is the measure of desirability, reasonable care must be
provided. Alternatively, reasonable care may mean care that is
better for the society than efficient care because health is different
than widgets, and other values outweigh efficiency. If that is the
case, then efficient, but unreasonable, care is undesirable. Thus, a
doctor who provides unreasonable care will never have done
anything desirable.
That does not mean that cost-benefit analysis and efficiency
judgments are irrelevant to medical decision making. As just noted,
reasonable care may be efficient care. Even if it is not, efficiency is
part of the calculus of reasonableness. Therefore, a doctor may well
decide that refusing to do a test is appropriate because the
likelihood of the patient having the tested-for condition is too low. If
a court agrees, it has not decided that the doctor efficiently breached
a contract with the patient. Rather, it has decided that the doctor
had no obligation to breach.
If the doctor promised to achieve a specific result or to cure the
patient, the doctor may decide to breach the contract because it is
not worth carrying out. A promise to make a person the double of a
named movie star for ten thousand dollars may turn out to be
foolish because the job will consume one hundred thousand dollars
worth of time, equipment, and expertise. However, if the doctor
breaches this contract, we do not praise him or her for doing the
efficient thing. Instead, (1) we either expect the promise to be
fulfilled because its nonperformance does not benefit society like
producing cheaper, better widgets does, or (2) we do not expect the
contract to be performed because it should never have been entered
into in the first place. It is an illegal contract, not a valid contract
that circumstances have made inefficient to enforce.
The one medical situation in which efficient breach may occur is
in the area of informed consent. Courts require so much
information to be given to patients to make their consents to
treatment adequately informed14 that a sensible business strategy
for a doctor may be to refrain from informing the patient and paying
him or her if the bad result occurs. After all, we are talking about
low-probability harms not caused by negligence and liability covered
by insurance. It may make much more sense for a doctor to rely on
14. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972) (an early case
adopting the so-called materiality standard of disclosure). For a particularly
egregious example, in which a drug company rather than a doctor was the
defendant, see Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1269 (5th Cir. 1974).
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the law of averages than the law of informed consent and not to
waste time informing patients about all and sundry "material" risks.
The irrelevance of efficient breach except in the informed
consent context is another relevant characteristic of the medical
malpractice issue.
E. Financing Health Care
The medical malpractice issue arises in a society whose
population runs the gamut from fabulous wealth to crushing
poverty. 5 Yet medical care is so expensive that only the truly rich
can afford to pay for it unaided. Almost everybody else is dependent
on some type of insurance. 6 The insurance "system," if it can be
called that, is a crazy quilt of private insurance paid for by
employers, private insurance paid for by individuals, federal
insurance (Medicare) for the elderly and mixed federal-state
insurance (Medicaid) for the very poor.' Approximately forty-six
million persons in the United States are without health insurance, '8
which means that except for certain emergency care,' 9 they are
dependent upon benevolence for their health care. To the extent
that care is provided free, someone must pay for it. It either will
come out of the pockets of providers (true benevolence) or will be
factored into the costs that are charged to paying patients.
American medical care is the most expensive in the world.2 ° Yet
by most measures it is not the most successful. The oft-repeated
15. However, New Zealand has adopted a much more egalitarian approach
to injury compensation than the United States, despite its similarly great
wealth disparity. Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act
2001, 2001 S.N.Z. No. 49 (N.Z.) (as amended 2005); DAVID SKILLING & ARATI M.
WALDEGRAVE, THE WEALTH OF A NATION: THE LEVEL & DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
IN NEW ZEALAND 7-8 (2004), available at http://www.nzinstitute.org/
Images/uploads/pubs/TheWealthof a_NationFullReport.pdf.
16. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 7, at 16-17.
17. Id. at 16.
18. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Stable, Poverty Rate
Increases, Percentage of Americans Without Health Insurance Unchanged
(Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/
income-wealth005647.html.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2000).
20. American per capita expenditure on health is $5,274 (in international
dollars), more than any other country. The United States' total expenditure on
health is 14.6% of gross domestic product, also the highest in the world. The
second highest total expenditure is Cambodia's 12%. General government
expenditure on health in the United States is 23.1% of total government
expenditures, tied for fourth highest in the world. WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS 2005 46-47, 52-53 (2005), available at
http://www3.who.int/statistics/worldhealth-stats 2005-part1.pdf.
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claim that American health care is the best in the world may be
better understood as meaning that those who can find and afford the
best our system has to offer will receive better care than they could
anywhere else in the world. For everyone else, the claim is
misleading. The United States ranks twenty-seventh in the world
in male and thirtieth in female life expectancy at birth; twenty-
eighth in male and female healthy life expectancy at birth; thirty-
sixth in male and forty-first in female adult mortality rate
(probability of dying between ages fifteen and sixty per one
thousand population); thirty-fourth in neonatal mortality rate;
twenty-ninth in maternal mortality rate; seventy-ninth in rate of
people living with AIDS (i.e., seventy-eight countries have lower
rates of persons infected with AIDS); sixty-first in infants with low
birth weight; seventy-second in measles immunization, fifty-fourth
in diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP3) immunization; and
fifty-fourth in hepatitis B3 immunization.' Overall, the World
Health Organization rates America's health care system thirty-
seventh in the world, immediately behind Costa Rica's and
immediately ahead of Slovenia's."
E. Politics and Morals
Medical malpractice is a hot political issue. However, unlike
some political issues of our age-abortion, euthanasia, stem cell
research, for example-it is not a moral issue except in the sense
that doing justice is always a moral issue. There is nothing
comparable here to the deeply held, often religiously based divide
between those who believe that human life exists from the moment
of conception and those who believe that a fetus is simply a parasite
in a woman's body.
The absence of a moral dimension means two contradictory
things. First, there is no room here for the criminal sanction, which
is inappropriate to punish anything other than nearly universally
morally condemned behavior. Second, extreme legal responses, like
use of the criminal law or constitutional adjudication, are not likely
to engender civil disobedience and massive disrespect for the law as
they have, for example, in the abortion context.
F. Nature and Structure of Government
Obviously, medical malpractice does not raise fundamental
issues of the nature and structure of the American government.
21. See generally id. (listing health statistics from around the world).
22. Geographic.org, The World Health Organization's Ranking of the
World's Health Systems, http://www.photius.com/rankings/healthranks.html
(last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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That means that there is no reason to seek resolution through
constitutional litigation and no reason to expect that constitutional
litigation would make a useful contribution to resolving the
problem.23
III. GOALS OF A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SYSTEM24
Having identified the characteristics of medical malpractice as a
legal issue, one should next attempt to identify the goals that a
malpractice system should serve. To the extent that the goals are
inconsistent, the inconsistencies must be recognized so that the
ultimately proposed solution can sacrifice as little as possible of each
desirable end.
A. Compensation
Persons who have been injured in a serious way through no
fault of their own should receive compensation for their injuries.
This is hardly a novel concept, providing as it does the basis for the
entire law of torts. Compensation has both ethical and practical
roots. First, simple justice requires it. Without compensation,
similarly situated persons would be treated dissimilarly: injury
victims would be arbitrarily singled out to bear the costs of activities
that could just as well have harmed someone else and from which
the society at large benefits.25 Second, it is required to provide a
perception of justice. A person injured by another will feel that
something must be paid to make things right. Third, compensation
is required to maximize the likelihood that an injured person will
receive the treatment and other assistance that he or she needs,
either to be restored to productivity or to make up for the lost
productivity of those who must care for him or her. Often, without
compensation, a person would not get better, with the result that his
or her life would not be as productive as it otherwise would have
been from either the person's or the society's perspective.
None of this is controversial. Controversy lies in the questions
of how much compensation is proper and from whom it should come.
23. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 15-18, 171.
24. For a somewhat different list of goals, see Michael J. Saks et al., A
Multiattribute Utility Analysis of Legal System Responses to Medical Injuries,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 277, 285-86 (2005).
25. One could argue that justice requires compensation even for seriously
injured persons who have been victims of acts of God. They too have been
singled out arbitrarily to suffer. This view, which has much to recommend it,
explains the desirability of social insurance. However, a discussion of non-
humanly inflicted injuries is beyond the scope of this Article.
2006]
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1. Amount
Although a few states have capped economic, as well as
26noneconomic, damages, most persons would agree that at least
some items of economic damage should be fully compensated. These
include medical, hospital, and rehabilitation expenses. At the
margins, room exists to argue about what is a proper rehabilitation
expense-a helper dog, a Braille reader, etc.-but those are minor
questions in the context of the malpractice issue as a whole. More
serious questions may exist about whether a person should receive
the present value of lost future income.27 On the one hand, such
amounts are likely to be hard to calculate, and in some cases they
will be very high. On the other hand, if the purpose of compensation
is to put the victim back as near as possible to the pre-accident
state, such compensation is proper. The system will have to include
a mechanism for answering this question.
Noneconomic damages are more controversial than economic
ones. 28 Money cannot take away pain, but it can provide substitutes
for the pain that may make a victim's life better, and it can indicate
the value that society places on the suffering that a victim
undergoes. However, pain and suffering and other noneconomic
damages are notoriously hard to calculate and to keep within
reasonable bounds. Moreover, while everyone in the society may
benefit from restoring an injured person to a state of productive
good health, it is hard to see what benefit the rest of us receive from
compensating victims for noneconomic losses. Of course, benefit to
all of us only matters if the payor is someone who passes costs on to
the rest of us. The system must have a way to answer the questions
about the propriety and amount of compensation for noneconomic
damages.
Punitive damages serve no legitimate compensatory function.
Therefore, consideration of whether they are appropriate must
involve some goal other than compensation.
26. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-302 (2004) (capping total
damages at $1,000,000, but limiting recovery of economic damages to $750,000).
27. See Gary A. Anderson & David L. Roberts, Economic Theory and the
Present Value of Future Lost Earnings: An Integration, Unification, and
Simplification of Court Adopted Methodologies, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 723, 732
(1985) (discussing the reasons for awarding present value of future income and
suggesting different models for determining present value).
28. Many more states have limited noneconomic damages than have
limited economic ones. See Saks et al., supra note 24, at 283 & 283 n.30; see
also H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 4 (2d Sess. 2004) (President Bush's proposed




The next question about compensation is from whom it should
come. Once we have decided that there should be compensation
(i.e., that losses should not lie where they fall), an almost infinite
array of possible payors exists, including the person who caused the
harm, the person whose fault it was, the employer of the person who
caused the harm or whose fault it was, one of those persons'
insurance companies, the injured person's insurance company, the
employer of the injured person, or the employer's insurance
company, the state or federal taxpayers, etc.
One must think through the implications of each of these
approaches. For example, placing the loss on an individual implies
that a decision has been made that conduct control and/or blame
assessment are goals of the system. Allowing costs to be passed to
insurance companies undercuts those goals. Imposing costs on
taxpayers disregards conduct control and blame assessment and is
based on the notion that we are all in this together and that justice
requires that we share the arbitrary losses that fall on some
members of the community. Placing losses on insurance companies
is a partial step in the same direction.
Obviously, compensation is not the only way to achieve blame
assessment and conduct control. Therefore, even if blame
assessment and/or conduct control are important goals of the
system, all possible sources of compensation remain available.
Indeed, part of the problem with the current malpractice system
may be that it attempts to achieve compensation, loss distribution,
and conduct control through the same mechanism. Compensation
even without insurance is an inefficient way to achieve conduct
control. With insurance it is close to worthless. 3' The reasons to
provide compensation are justice, the perception of justice, and
restoration, all for the victim. None of those reasons requires
focusing on the actor who caused the harm or whose fault it was.
Compensation is an important policy apart from conduct control or
blame assessment. Therefore, conduct control and blame
assessment should not be considered in deciding upon whom to place
losses unless one is convinced that placing losses on appropriate
actors really will achieve appropriate levels of blame assessment
and conduct control. As discussed below, that seems very unlikely.
B. Conduct Control
Conduct control-getting the health care system and those who
29. See discussion infra Part III.B.
30. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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act within it to cause the optimal number of accidents-is an
important rhetorical part of the present malpractice system. Trial
lawyers often accuse doctors of practicing bad medicine,3 unbiased
studies suggest that there is much more bad medical practice than
there is litigation about it, 32 and the system itself speaks the
language of fault, theoretically imposing liability only on negligent
• • 33
practitioners. Doctors and their allies often complain that the
system works too well to control conduct, leading doctors to practice
"defensive medicine," i.e., to do things to avoid litigation, rather
than because the patient's condition requires it.
34
Let's think about this. First, conduct control is not a policy that
can be pursued the same way for different actors and different kinds
of actions. Hospitals, HMOs, and other organizations are much
more likely to have their behavior affected by the law than are
doctors. An organization acting to maximize profits (or at least to
minimize losses) and with time to plan its behavior can seek legal
advice and act on it. If it is negligent for a hospital with more than
one hundred beds to fail to have a Magnetic Resonance Imaging
("MRI") scanner, then a hospital with ninety-five beds can decide to
forego expansion, or can expand and buy an MRI. The law will
affect its behavior.
An individual physician is much less likely to be affected by the
law. As discussed earlier, efficient breach by a physician is almost
• • 35
inconceivable. No physician other than the occasional lunatic
wants or tries to injure a patient or to provide substandard care.
Physician negligence is most likely to involve an unplanned
mistake-a missed shadow on an X-ray, a slip of the scalpel, a
forgotten possible diagnosis, etc. The threat of liability cannot make
a person avoid unplanned mistakes. Everybody gets tired, gets
careless, gets overconfident, has a clumsy moment, and so forth.
Law can affect some individual behavior. For example, if a doctor is
told that it is always negligent to fail to do a glaucoma test on a
31. See, e.g., Leo Boyle, President's Page: The Truth about Medical
Malpractice, TRIAL, Apr. 2002, at 9, 9.
32. See, e.g., JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTH CARE ORGS.,
HEALTH CARE AT THE CROSSROADS: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING THE MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM AND PREVENTING PATIENT INJURY 4 (2005), available at
http://www.jcaho.org/NR/rdonlyres/167DD821-A395-48FD-87F9-6AB12BCA
CBOF/o/Medical-Liability.pdf [hereinafter JCAHO].
33. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 631 (2000).
34. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk
Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609,
2609-10 (2005).
35. See supra Part II.D.
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patient under the age of forty,36 the doctor will either always do the
test or decide that the rule is so stupid that he or she will not follow
it. Liability in that instance will enforce the legally desired behavior
or result in payment (i.e., suffering) by the doctor. In most cases,
however, liability is unlikely to affect the behavior of individuals.
Even so-called cases of defensive medicine are like the glaucoma
case-doing unnecessary tests-not examples of avoiding slip-ups.
Second, as noted above,37 compensation of victims by those who
(perhaps negligently) caused their harm is a woefully bad way to
control conduct, even for organizational actors. If one wants another
person to behave in a certain way, one must tell the person in clear
language in advance what to do. A common law system that tells
people after they have acted that they did the wrong thing and that
decides cases one at a time based on subtle factual differences is ill-
designed to achieve compliance.
Moreover, allowing tortfeasors to pass losses on to their
insurance companies undercuts the conduct control function of
compensation. If a potential defendant knows that it will have to
pay one million dollars if it negligently causes a one million dollar
injury to someone, it is more likely to try to avoid injury than if it
knows that its insurer will pay the one million dollars, and all the
provider will have to pay is a premium that reflects a small part of
the one million dollars and that is also affected by things beyond the
provider's control, like other providers' behavior and the insurance
company's investment experience. After all, the whole point of
insurance is the sharing and distribution of costs so that their
impact on any one individual is minimized. That is not consistent
with controlling the conduct of individuals.8
Finally, conduct control seems to have greater rhetorical than
real weight if one looks at what courts actually do. The clearest
conduct control cases would seem to be those in which courts adopt a
rule to be universally followed in the future. For example, Helling v.
Carey39 involved a thirty-two-year-old woman who repeatedly
consulted her ophthalmologist about problems with her eyes, but
who had no symptoms of glaucoma. Uncontradicted medical
testimony revealed that the chances of an asymptomatic patient
under the age of forty having glaucoma was one in twenty-five
thousand and that ophthalmologists, therefore, do not test such
patients for glaucoma. Ms. Helling did have glaucoma, which
caused her to lose most of her vision before it was diagnosed. In her
36. See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974).
37. See supra Part III.B.
38. See discussion infra Part III.E.
39. 519 P.2d 981.
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lawsuit against her ophthalmologist, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that failure to give Ms. Helling the glaucoma test
was negligent as a matter of law.4° That is because glaucoma is a
serious disease whose damage can be arrested if there is a timely
diagnosis, 41 and because the test is simple, safe, inexpensive,
accurate and requires no judgment.42 Patients under forty years of
age are entitled to the same protection as patients over forty.43
The conduct control message is clear: ophthalmologists (at least)
must give the glaucoma test to all their patients, including
asymptomatic infants. Physicians must give all tests that are as
safe, inexpensive, accurate, and judgment-free as the glaucoma test
to all patients with a risk of one in twenty-five thousand or more for
all diseases that are as serious (whatever that means) as glaucoma.
One can only wonder what the risk factor would be if a disease were
"worse" than glaucoma, a disease were not quite as bad, but the test
was safer, etc. Given Helling, routine physical exams in the state of
Washington should take weeks and cost thousands of dollars. Of
course, that is absurd. No doctor in his or her right mind would
allow Helling to govern his or her conduct, and no sane patient
would want him or her to. Helling is a decision about who should
bear the costs of youthful glaucoma, not about controlling conduct.
Similarly, Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hospital4 appears to be
about conduct control. There a young boy was to undergo elective
surgery for crossed eyes. He had heightened indicators of possible
cardiac and respiratory arrest from anesthesia: crying, agitation,
unsatisfactory sedation despite double the dose of medication used
only two months before, a runny nose, and maybe a fever.45 The
ophthalmologist and anesthesiologist made no plans for how to deal
with a cardio/respiratory arrest should one occur. While the
anesthesiologist was administering anesthesia, the child suffered a
cardiac and respiratory arrest. The ophthalmologist did not know
how to perform a thoracotomy (opening of the patient's chest) to do
internal heart massage. By the time he located a general surgeon
who was able to do the procedure and restart the heart, the patient
had been without oxygen for so long that he was rendered blind,
mute, spastic, and quadriplegic.
Despite having no evidence to support its conclusion, the
Supreme Court of California held that a jury could find the




44. 397 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1964).
45. Id. at 163-66.
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ophthalmologist negligent for failing to have someone in the
operating room who could do a thoracotomy or for being unable to do
one himself.46 As a way to provide compensation to a tragically
injured child or to allocate the costs of anesthesia injuries, the case
is easy to accept. As a conduct control case, on the other hand, it is
absurd. Do we really want surgeons (a scarce resource) to be
standing around in operating rooms doing nothing except raising the
cost of surgery instead of operating on patients? If the
ophthalmologist could not do a thoracotomy, whose "fault" was that?
Likely, it was the "fault" of his medical school or residency training
program. How absurd it is to think that a court should use a
lawsuit against a physician to instruct medical schools and
residency programs that are not even parties to the litigation what
their curricula should be! Again, compensation and conduct control
are two entirely different, and not necessarily related, goals.
Res ipsa loquitur cases are yet another example of the lack of
connection between compensation and conduct control. For
example, in Ybarra v. Spangard,47 the court used res ipsa to hold
four doctors and two nurses jointly and severally liable for an injury
that may have happened while the patient was unconscious and that
could not have happened in the presence of all of the defendants.48
Even more strikingly, in Anderson v. Somberg,4 9 the court applied a
doctrine "akin" to res ipsa loquitur 5° to require a jury verdict against
at least one of four defendants, two of whom had not even been sued
for negligence, in a situation in which numerous other persons could
just as well have been responsible for the harm. 51 Cases like these
may be about trying to force defendants to testify against each other
or may just be about compensation and loss spreading, but they
have nothing to do with controlling conduct outside the courtroom.
Controlling health care providers' conduct to get them to
practice as closely as possible to optimally is an important social
goal. Achieving that goal through providing compensation seems
unlikely.
C. Placing Blame
Closely related to conduct control is blame assessment. When
something goes wrong we always like to know whose fault it is.
Placing blame makes us feel that we understand what has happened
46. Id. at 166-68.
47. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
48. Id. at 688-89, 691.
49. 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975).
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id. at 3, 7-8.
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and relieves the non-blameworthy of the stigma of guilt.52  If
accompanied by publicity, placing blame can hurt wrongdoers
economically as well as emotionally. If patients have any sense and
any choice at all, they will presumably choose doctors who have
never or seldom been blamed for injuring patients, rather than those
who have often been labeled wrongdoers. This suggests that placing
blame plus publicity may have some effect on providers' conduct to
the extent that the conduct can be changed. The conduct control
comes from placing blame, not from compensating the victim.
D. Satisfying Expectations
Medical care involves the abject dependence of an inexpert
patient on an expert physician or other health care provider. These
providers are limited in part because of the monopoly provided by
the state.53 The patient is ill-equipped to bargain about the services
to be provided. Therefore, the patient must be protected in his or
her expectation that the provided services will be competent.
Innkeepers and common carriers have traditionally been held to a
higher standard of care than members of most other industries54
because of the total dependence of guests or passengers upon them
and because anyone, if asked, would say (whatever he or she paid)
that they were buying a safe room for the night or safe passage from
Point A to Point B. Medical care is similar, but the monopoly and
other restrictive practices noted above55 make the need to protect
expectations even stronger than they are with regard to carriers and
lodgings. Somebody has to make sure that the patients get what
they pay for.
52. What Torts teacher has not been driven crazy by first-year law students
who insist on discussing whether a tort defendant was "guilty," rather than the
correct question of whether the defendant is liable? I suggest that this misuse
of the concept of guilt results from two things: (1) human beings' insatiable
appetite for placing blame, and (2) the insistence of our tort system on basing
liability on "fault," a concept that bears little relation to what "fault" means to
an ordinary person speaking English. Note that even the supposedly strict
liability area of products liability has been moving rapidly back in the direction
of liability based on fault, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 (1998) (listing categories of product defect); DAVID G. OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 33 (2005) (noting how strict liability is increasingly
giving way to principles of negligence), and even the supposedly non-fault-based
concept of causation is really part of assessing blame. Imagine a four-year-old
child who is alone in a room when Mommy's priceless antique vase falls to the
floor and breaks. What is the child's instinctive response when Mommy runs
into the room? "I didn't do it, Mommy. It's not my fault."
53. See supra Part II.C.
54. See DOBBS, supra note 33, at 261, 383-84.




Any system that provides compensation for injured persons
must be concerned about the way the costs of compensation are
distributed. This is part of the question of who the payor should
be.56 Before that question can be addressed, however, one must
decide whether distribution among a number of payors is desirable.
This is the question of loss spreading.
The theory of loss spreading is that a huge loss will have a less
devastating effect if it is borne in small increments by a large
number of persons than if it is borne entirely by one person. 7 On
this view it is no better for an injurer to bear an entire loss than for
an injured person to do so. Except for the different marginal utility
of dollars for persons with different degrees of wealth,58 the impact
of a one million dollar loss is just as devastating for a doctor as for a
patient. Therefore, if minimizing the negative impact of losses is a
goal, and if spreading really does minimize impact, one goal of the
system should be to spread losses. This suggests that insurance
should be allowed or that taxpayers should bear the costs of medical
injuries. Either approach is inconsistent with using liability as a
means of conduct control.
As between insurers and taxpayers, the question is whether all
consumers of health care should pay for medical injuries or whether
all citizens should bear the cost. With medical care, unlike with
luxury products like private jet airplanes, for example, the two
classes of potential payors are likely to overlap very significantly.
Almost everyone is a consumer of health care, just as almost
everyone is a taxpayer. If that is so, the questions become (1)
whether it is more fair59 to place costs on consumers/taxpayers
generally or to place them on consumers of specific services by, for
example, making patients of ophthalmologists pay for eye injuries
and patients of obstetricians pay for injuries they suffer while giving
birth, and (2) whether one system is easier 60 and cheaper6 1 to
administer than the other.
56. See supra Part III.A.2.
57. See Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 456
(1923) (noting that it is more expedient to spread loss among a large group than
to focus it on a few individuals).
58. At the time the system is being created, we cannot know how rich a
particular injurer or a particular injured person will be, although it will
probably often be the case that a health provider is richer than a patient.
Therefore, we must assume that a dollar is a dollar as the system is designed.
59. See infra Part III.H.
60. See infra Part III.G.
61. See infra Part III.F.
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F. Cost Containment
Whoever is to bear the costs of medical injuries, the costs should
not be excessive. Excessive costs imposed on an individual payor
are unfair; excessive costs imposed on a collective are wasteful. The
difficulty lies in determining excessiveness. At first blush, excessive
costs would seem to be those that increase the costs of accidents.
For example, if a medical accident causes $1,000,000 worth of
damage, but the insurance company (and through it, providers and
eventually patients) are required to pay $2,000,000 plus $700,000 in
legal fees and other litigation costs, and the taxpayers pay $5,000 to
administer the system, and providers also raise prices because the
decision leads them to practice defensive medicine, then the system
seems excessively expensive.
However, that may be an overly simplistic view. In the
hypothetical instance just described, three kinds of costs are
involved: compensation costs, administrative costs, and conduct
control costs. With regard to compensation, the real question is not
whether the payor should pay more than the injury's cost; the
question is: what is the cost of the injury? This takes us back to the
question of economic versus noneconomic damages. It is arbitrary to
say that noneconomic damages are not part of the true cost of an
injury and, therefore, to consider all noneconomic awards excessive.
What is required is to devise a system in which the decision maker
is charged and well suited to assess the accurate costs of an injury
and to impose them and no more. If noneconomic damages are
sometimes too high, that may not be because such damages are
improperly considered or not arbitrarily limited. It may be because
jurors are ill-equipped to make accurate cost decisions, and lawyers
are presently almost required to whip jurors into a frenzy of anger
at the provider in order to obtain any damages at all. That anger
may lead to excessive awards. This suggests that changing the
decision maker and the threshold for any award may be the most
effective way to determine which awards would be excessive and to
avoid them.
Administrative costs also are not necessarily excessive even
though they obviously add some cost to the cost of the accident itself.
Every compensation or conduct control system imaginable has to be
administered. Only letting losses lie where they fall is
administratively cost-free. However, this does not mean that
administrative costs are wasteful or excessive. They are the cost we
pay for having a civilized society, the costs of the rule of law. They
provide far more benefits than simply sorting out a medical
malpractice claim.
Here what cost containment and the avoidance of excess require
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is not the elimination of administrative costs, but rather avoiding
the creation of a system that adds extra costs for no good end. In
the malpractice setting, that suggests that we should rethink a
system that requires lengthy, ultimately unproductive litigation
about whose "fault" an accident was and that is misguidedly
directed toward conduct control. Systems based on factors other
than fault can be administered more cheaply than fault-based
systems. If nothing is lost for the savings, they should be pursued.
Similarly, conduct control costs, like the costs of defensive
medicine, are not necessarily excessive. "Defensive medicine" is a
slogan with political bite, not a meaningful concept. Suppose a
doctor or other health care provider really does do something to
avoid litigation or to increase the chance of winning if litigation
should arise. That is defensive medicine. Is it necessarily wasteful?
No. Defensive medicine is only wasteful and, therefore, excessively
costly if the socially best practice of medicine is the medically best
practice of medicine. People who argue against defensive medicine
assume that the level of practice that doctors think appropriate is
appropriate. One could argue that the lesson of decades of
malpractice decisions is that society does not accept that view. If
society wants better medical care than doctors think they should
provide, then it makes sense for society to try to push doctors toward
providing the desired level of performance. Only a blind failure to
recognize that health is a value that far transcends economic
efficiency would suggest that medicine should be left to the doctors
any more than war should be left to the generals. Defensive
medicine is excessively costly if, and only if, doctors are doing things
that society, rather than the medical profession itself, thinks they
should not do.
Cost containment is important. Like all other goals, it is
complicated. What is needed is a system that can evaluate claims of
excessive cost and avoid them, not an a priori determination that
some kinds of costs are always excessive.
G. Ease of Administration
Related to cost containment is the goal of ease of
administration. Usually the simpler a system is to administer, the
cheaper it will be. In addition, simplicity reduces the likelihood of
errors, promotes public understanding, and generally makes
everyone's life easier. All else being equal, a system that is easy to
administer is better than one that is hard.
H. Fairness
Obviously, any medical malpractice system should be fair. That
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means several things: it should treat like cases alike, it should avoid
inappropriate stigmatization, and it should be honest.
The present system does not treat like cases alike. It is unfair
to both providers and patients. The system, based on negligence, is
so arbitrary and haphazard in its determinations that, in terms of
plaintiffs' recovery, it has often been likened to a lottery.62 Few
plaintiffs recover anything; a few, who are no more deserving,
recover gigantic amounts. From defendants' point of view, the
system is at least equally arbitrary. Not only does a doctor's
liability depend on the bad luck of his or her conduct hurting
somebody, but also on the injured person figuring that out, finding
an effective lawyer, hanging on through years of litigation, and
prevailing in the tort lottery. Moreover, as we have already
suggested, courts often make decisions on bases other than fault,"
so that one doctor will be held liable and another will not for exactly
the same conduct.
This practice of labeling as negligent behavior that no fair-
minded person speaking English would call negligent is also
horribly unfair to doctors in that it stigmatizes them for doing what
any other competent member of their profession would have done in
the same circumstance. As Washington Supreme Court Justice
Utter noted in his concurring opinion in Helling v. Carey, this is the
application of strict liability, and no useful purpose is served by
attaching the stigmatizing label to the doctor.64 No wonder many
physicians hate the legal system!
Finally, and again related, the system is not fair to the extent
that it is dishonest. If the system purports to base liability on fault,
but instead bases it on judgments about whether physicians are
appropriate conduits through whom to pass losses, it cheats the
public out of being able to evaluate its legal system and leads to
stigmatization and unequal treatment. A system must be honest to
be fair.
I. Scientific Accuracy and Scientific Sense
Medicine is partly based on science. One goal of a malpractice
system should be to make scientific sense or at least not to be
scientifically inaccurate. However, it would be easy to overstate the
importance of this goal. Medicine is only partly a matter of science,
and medical malpractice is only partly a matter of medicine. Like
all law, medical malpractice is a multidimensional social issue. Just
62. A Google search of the term torts lottery (without quotations), on April
1, 2006, resulted in 437,000 hits. http://www.google.com.
63. See supra notes 33, 44-46 and accompanying text.
64. 519 P.2d 981, 984 (Wash. 1974) (Utter, J., concurring).
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as the criminal law question of "insanity" is a question of what is the
best thing to do with certain offenders in terms of their mental
abilities and the demands of justice, costs and ease of
administration, impact on persons outside the system, etc.,65 so too
the question of medical malpractice is the question of how the
society can best deal with certain kinds of injuries in order to
achieve justice, avoid waste, encourage doctors to do what the
society wants, etc., and make scientific sense. It is possible that
when all the goals are pursued it may make sense to sacrifice
scientific accuracy sometimes.
IV. DESIGNING THE SYSTEM
What would a sensible medical malpractice system that
recognized the characteristics of the problem and attempted to
sacrifice as little as possible of each of its goals look like? First and
most importantly, a properly designed medical malpractice system
would be not one system but two. The critical insight in dealing
with medical malpractice is that conduct control and loss allocation
are two problems that are best resolved separately. Tort litigation is
too clumsy, too indirect, too fact specific, too backward looking, and
too tied to liability insurance to permit sound conduct control. It can
lead to defensive medicine or to inadequate regard for patient
safety, but there is no reason to believe that it will lead to optimal
medical conduct. Similarly, compensation tied to the elusive goal of
conduct control will lead to lottery-like payoffs (nothing for most
persons, bonanzas for a few), unfairness in the sense that neither
similarly situated doctors nor similarly situated plaintiffs are
treated alike, inappropriate stigmatization, and too little concern for
scientific accuracy and medical good sense.
A. Compensation
Perhaps surprisingly, the compensation system may be the
easier of the two to create. Compensation divorced from conduct
control requires the same expertise that would be required to decide
on proper compensation for injuries caused by an automobile
accident, an accidental shooting, a defective product, or any other
kind of injury. It also requires some expertise to decide whether
medical conduct caused the injury. However, it does not require
expert evaluation of the behavior that caused the injury. Thus,
doctors asked to participate in the system by evaluating injuries
may do so with less temptation to protect or to punish their
colleagues than if the system based compensation on an evaluation
65. See DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 4, 167, and authorities cited therein.
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of conduct.
Second, all patients who have suffered similar injuries caused
by medical mal-occurrences need similar remediation.66 Thus, the
amount of damages awarded can be determined without attention to
the particular conduct that caused the injury other than to find that
it was medical conduct. This still raises two questions: (1) What is
"medical conduct," and (2) what does one mean by causation?
Medical conduct is simply conduct that a professional is
performing pursuant to his, her, or its authorization to practice. It
includes failures to act (not ordering tests) as well as actions, but it
does not include things that a nonprofessional might do, like driving
to the hospital, even if one is driving fast to reach a patient in need
of speedy assistance. Whatever would be considered the practice of
medicine under a state's medical practice act would be medical
conduct.
Causation is more problematic. If conduct control is not part of
the compensation decision, then no need exists to determine
whether a doctor's conduct was blameworthy. However, causation
has inescapable hints of blame. Why else do we apologize when we
hurt someone even if we have done nothing wrong, and why do we
couple claims of innocence with claims of noninvolvement: "I didn't
do it; it's not my fault." Fault considerations often slip into
supposedly non-fault inquiries, like whether a product was
defective. Thus, the system must struggle mightily to repress
considerations of blameworthiness from the apparently morally
neutral inquiry into causation. One way to do that is to have
compensation (including causation) decisions made by trained
decision makers who have been taught to distinguish factual
causation from placement of blame. This begins to suggest the
nature of the decision-making body.
A second problem with causation is one alluded to earlier.68
Persons who suffer medical injuries started out with a problem.
Somebody must separate the inevitable consequences of the
patient's injury or illness from those that were medically caused.
Unfortunately, that task requires medical expertise, which means
that there will still be some danger of professional self-interest
entering the process. This too has implications for the nature of the
66. This is actually true of all injured persons, regardless of what caused
their injuries. However, exploring the feasibility of a New Zealand-style
compensation system for all accidental injuries in the United States is beyond
the scope of this Article. See supra note 15.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998)
(listing categories of product defect).




Once the decision maker has decided that medical conduct
caused an injury, it must decide how much compensation to award.
Many approaches are possible. Damages could be litigated and
evaluated like they are now in the tort system. A schedule, similar
to a workers' compensation schedule, could be developed. Each
person could be evaluated in an effort to return him or her to the
pre-accident position; persons could be placed into groups based on
wealth, occupation, previous health, family obligations, etc.; or we
could take the position that all persons are equal, so that for
compensation purposes an arm is an arm.
What position to take is a quintessentially political question. It
will reflect the society's values about individualism versus
communitarianism; rewarding past achievement and high birth or
attempting to engage in economic leveling; how expensive to make
medical services, etc. In other words, it is a question for the
legislature.
So, too, is the question about whether to permit and, if so,
whether and how to limit noneconomic damages. Punitive damages,
on the other hand, would plainly be inappropriate as they would be
inconsistent with the focus on compensation divorced from conduct
control and would risk creating an overlap with the conduct control
mechanism and making medical care unduly expensive."
Given these observations, the proper course is fairly clear. Each
state legislature70 should create and empower a medical
compensation board which will provide the exclusive remedy for
patients injured by medical conduct. The legislature should
determine the compensation scheme-methods of valuation, what to
do about noneconomic damages, etc.-and charge the board to
administer it. At least a majority of the board members should not
be health professionals, and conflict-of-interest rules should
eliminate insurance company executives, hospital board members,
and the like.
The board members must be trained to separate claims of
factual causation from claims of blameworthiness. Evidence about
professional standards and other evidence that could invite
consideration of fault should be inadmissible before the board. The
nonphysicians on the board must not only hold a majority of the
seats, they must also be high-powered individuals who are unlikely
69. See supra Part III.A.1.
70. Malpractice is traditionally a state matter, and values can be expected
to differ from state to state. When trying something new it is usually a good
idea to follow Justice Brandeis's advice and use the states as laboratories. New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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to be cowed by their professional colleagues' claims of expertise.
In making its initial decision to remit compensation decisions to
the board, the legislature will have to decide who is to provide the
compensation. The most sensible decision would probably be to
have compensation financed by the taxpayers. That would have
several advantages. First, it would make everybody pay what has
been independently determined to be their appropriate share of
state expenses for services from which everyone benefits. Second, it
would free the cost of medical care from being affected by the
successful or unsuccessful investment strategies of insurance
companies. Third, it would get a lobbying force out of the process,
thereby maximizing the likelihood that the system will be beneficial
to all. Fourth, it would give the state a measure of control over one
component of medical costs. Given the importance of controlling
medical costs for everyone, and especially the importance of
controlling taxpayer costs for financing medical care for the poor
without affecting the quality of care, this is an extremely important
advantage.
Nonetheless, the decision about how to finance the system is
properly a political decision, and the compensation board approach
could function even if the legislature decided to have it funded by
insurance companies, by a surtax on doctors, or in some other way.
B. Conduct Control
The tort system does a lousy job of getting doctors to practice
optimal medicine, as do both state-run and intra-professional
approaches to medical discipline.
1. Torts
For reasons discussed before,7 a common law tort system is
unlikely to be very effective for controlling physician behavior.
However, it will lead to inappropriate stigmatization, professional
alienation from the system, wasteful litigation expense, and unfair
compensation. This is not only theoretically true. It is true in fact.
Malpractice litigation could try to achieve both general and
special deterrence; i.e., it could try to prevent an offending doctor
from offending again, and it could try to make an example of an
offending doctor so that other doctors do not make the same
missteps as the defendant. It will not be very good at either.
First, in order for a particular doctor to be "disciplined" by the
system, the doctor must be very unlucky. His or her negligent
behavior must hurt somebody, and the injured patient must be one
71. See supra Part III.B.
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of the two percent of medically injured patients who figures out the
medical cause of his or her injury, decides to do something about it,
and finds a lawyer to take the case.72 Then, the patient must persist
for several years before seeing whether he or she has won the tort
lottery. The doctor will only lose if the patient's lawyer is good, the
patient is persistent, and the judge and jury happen to find for the
plaintiff. All told only thirty-four percent of patients win jury
verdicts in medical malpractice cases.73 That means that even if all
of those verdicts result in judgments, only 0.68% of patients injured
by medical activities obtain a judgment.74
On the other hand, many doctors are terrified of the tort
system. Some may practice defensive medicine. Others will simply
be irate when confronted with the occasional totally unfair
determination of negligence. They will quite properly ignore the
apparently irrational demands of the law. If a person is arbitrarily
exposed to the whims of the law, that person may under-react or
overreact, but it would be naive to believe that the person will
respond by practicing socially optimal medicine.
Similarly, how can the system hope to cause physicians in
general to practice good medicine? Physicians see colleagues
winning and losing lawsuits apparently at random. They do not
learn any lessons because there are no lessons to learn. When the
system does occasionally say something clear-like do a glaucoma
test on everybody 75-the doctor has two choices: (1) comply, in which
event the system has achieved conduct control, but only by making
doctors do something ill-advised and wasteful, or (2) not comply, in
which event better medicine will have been achieved by flouting the
system than by following it. Some better approach to making
doctors practice optimal medicine must be found.
2. Discipline
Two systems of medical discipline exist: (1) state discipline
administered by boards of medical practice, and (2) intra-
professional discipline administered by hospital credentials
committees and by such devices as morbidity and mortality
conferences.
As presently constituted, state disciplinary boards are not up to
72. See JCAHO, supra note 32, at 4, 44 nn.3-4.
73. Medical Malpractice Today.com, Health Care Providers Win Most
Cases, http://www.medicalmalpracticetoday.com/medicalmalpracticestats-hcp
winmore.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006) (citing jury verdict research from
1995 to 2000).
74. Of course, some patients obtain settlements.
75. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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the task. Traditionally, professional incompetence was not even a
ground for professional discipline in most states.'6 Moreover, state
disciplinary boards are underfunded and understaffed.77 They rely
on complaints and reports of tort judgments and settlements to find
candidates for discipline, rather than having significant case-finding
operations. Once again, whether a doctor is exposed to professional
discipline is largely a matter of luck. The discipline system has
virtually no effect on making doctors practice good medicine.
Hospital committees are a bit better. Doctors who practice
badly enough can be denied privileges or have privileges
conditioned, suspended, or revoked." This does have the effect of
getting some of the worst doctors out of positions where they can do
the most harm. In addition, morbidity and mortality conferences
within a medical institution can both educate physicians about their
mistakes and the mistakes of others and how to avoid repeating
them and expose bad practice to colleagues who might otherwise
refer patients to the offending physician.9
Nonetheless, this is a far from adequate system of conduct
control. Some practice can be done without needing to be on a
hospital staff. Morbidity and mortality conferences only occur after
a bad result has occurred, not after bad practice has occurred.
Despite federal databases, ° physicians can obtain privileges at
different hospitals in their community or move. Hospital
conferences and credentialing decisions occur in secret, so that
patients have almost no chance to become informed and make
prudent decisions about which doctors to employ.
In addition to these shortcomings, the hospital committee
system has other failures. First, it is run by doctors, which means
that at best it will promote medically best medicine-the medicine
doctors think should be practiced. However, as we have noted, the
goal is to encourage doctors to practice socially best medicine, which
76. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW PUBLICATION No. (OS)
73-88, 51-55 (1973), reprinted in WALTER WADLINGTON, JOHN R. WALTZ, & ROGER
B. DWORKIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND MEDICINE 79-82 (1980).
77. Id. at 51-55, reprinted in WALTER WADLINGTON, JOHN R. WALTZ, ROGER
B. DWORKIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND MEDICINE 79-82 (1980).
78. See Peter M. Mellette, The Changing Focus of Peer Review Under
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may be something very different indeed.8'
Finally, the hospital credentialing and discipline system is
unfair to doctors. Doctors have too few procedural protections and
far too little protection against exclusion from privileges because of
racial, sexual, or other prejudice; animus based on the nature of
their practice; economic protectionism; or general distrust of
82
newcomers.
Clearly, some alternative system of controlling physician
behavior is required.
3. A Better Way?
In order to do as good a job as possible of controlling physician
behavior, a system must have the ability to find doctors who practice
poorly regardless of whether their bad practice resulted in patient
injury. It must be able to recognize and punish the practice of
socially sub-optimal medicine. It must satisfy patient expectations,
publicize its decisions in order to protect patients, and impose
sanctions that increase the likelihood of improving the quality of
care, not simply driving doctors out of practice. It must be fair to
doctors, and while it should not defer to medical opinion about what
is good medicine, it should value such opinion, and it should make
medical-scientific sense.
Only an administrative body can accomplish these goals. State
medical disciplinary boards should be expanded in size and should
have their budgets substantially increased. They should be
composed of physicians from many specialties and nonphysicians
with the education and strength of personality to challenge their
professional colleagues. They must have an investigative staff that
both responds to complaints and does routine, periodic quality
audits of hospitals and physicians.
Physicians whose audits suggest they are in need of discipline
should receive a hearing before the board or a panel of it. They
should be entitled to representation by counsel and to substantial
procedural protections, such as notice of charges, confrontation of
witnesses, etc. Hearing panels should include both physicians and
nonphysicians, probably with nonphysicians in the majority. The
panels should have the authority to revoke or suspend a doctor's
license, place a doctor on probation, restrict a doctor's practice,
81. See supra Part III.F.
82. See, e.g., Guerrero v. Burlington County Mem'l Hosp., 360 A.2d 334,
336 (N.J. 1976) (upholding defendant hospital's decision to deny admission to
two surgeons based allegedly on limited capacity). The inadequate federal
effort to deal with these problems may be seen at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11113
(2000).
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require retraining and reexamination, require abstinence from
alcohol or drugs coupled with participation in rehabilitation
programs, and whatever other penalties are appropriate. They must
conduct their hearings in public and publish their conclusions and
recommendations in a form and location where ordinary patients
can readily access them. Doctors should have a right to appeal.
While a system such as this seems likely to be expensive, it will
probably actually save money. Remember that it is to accompany an
administrative-based compensation system that will not involve
determinations of fault and that will probably reduce the size of
awards. 3 Net savings may well result.
More importantly, separating the compensation and conduct
control functions of malpractice law should make both parts function
better. Lottery-style recoveries, inequality, arbitrariness, and
excessive damage awards should all be avoided, while the quality of
medical practice and the ability of patients to make informed choices
about their health care providers should be improved. All the goals
of the malpractice system will be served better than any of them are
being served now.
V. CONCLUSION
A focus on legal process, comparing the characteristics of the
medical malpractice problem and the goals of the malpractice
system with the characteristics of legal institutions, leads to the
conclusion that abandoning tort recovery for malpractice and
devising separate, unrelated systems for patient compensation and
physician discipline will significantly improve our system for dealing
with medical mal-occurrences. A similar focus on characteristics of
problems and characteristics of institutions may well be superior to
substantively based approaches to other issues of health law and
perhaps to other areas of law as well.8I
83. See supra Part IV.A.
84. Professor Einer Elhauge has pointed out to me that one could reach the
same conclusions about medical malpractice reform that I have suggested by
using different modes of analysis, such as law and economics. That is correct.
However, the legal process approach suggested here is attractive in part
because it is ideologically neutral and does not require a person considering
reform to start with a substantive preference.
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